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Realities of data sharing using the genome








The importance of data sharing has become a mantra within the science research
community. However, sharing has not been as easy (or as readily adopted) as
advocates have suggested. Questions of privacy, individual scientist’s rights to their
research, and industry-academia divides have been signiﬁcant hurdles. This article
looks at the history of the debates and problems associated with data access that
occurred during the ‘human genome wars’ and their aftermath as a way to explore
some of the challenges facing diverse research communities.
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Introduction
In  Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the World Wide Web, described the power of
linked data, the crucial need to get it ‘unlocked from individual silos,’ and the imperative to
stop people, governments, and enterprises from ‘database hugging’ []. The ability to pool
datasets generated by diﬀerent researchers (or organizations or governments) has been
considered crucial to achieving progress in areas as diverse as personalized medicine and
sustainability. Those who see data sharing as providing a public good often insist that even
the investigators who generate data have an obligation to their funders and the general
public to release it - thus superseding their individual rights to explore the data ﬁrst. As
described by Alan Guttmacher et al. (), ‘The model of the investigator owning data
has been increasingly replaced by one in which society owns data’ [, p.].
The reality, however, is that most researchers don’t currently share their data volun-
tarily even when it is made easy [–]. Recently researchers from the National Science
Foundation-fundedDataONEproject () conducted a survey ofmore than , scientists
and concluded that ‘Barriers to eﬀective data sharing and preservation are deeply rooted
in the practices and culture of the research process as well as the researchers themselves.’
The purpose of this article is to examine one process of data sharing in detail in the hope
that the problems and successes can inform the system more generally. One of the arenas
in which debates over this issue were especially visible and acrimonious concerned the
data that represent the foundation of our genetic heritage. It is certainly true that success
at delivering the ﬁrst human genome sequence would have major impacts on the egos
and careers of an array of aggressive, colorful people. This includes, but is not limited to
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leaders of the private (commercial) and public eﬀorts, - J. Craig Venter on one side and
Francis Collins and Sir John Sulston (plus a cast of associates) on the other. However, the
primary focus of this article will be on the debates and discussions regarding the value of
information and information access.
The so-called ‘genome wars’ did not occur in isolation, as events related to information
access were occurring in a variety of disciplines. This focus is ofmuchmore than historical
interest. As I will discuss in the concluding section, the realities of data sharing, the chal-
lenges of simultaneously fostering research and preserving individual privacy, and debates
over the use of commercial data continue to pose challenges for scientists from a variety
of disciplines, ranging from genomics to the social sciences.
The human genome
A genome is the sum total of all of our genetic information, encoded in an ordered se-
quence of  billion nucleotides. The information locked in that sequence has enormous
symbolic value as our human inheritance. Such data also has potential value as a jumping
oﬀ point to learn about the genetic pathways involved in human disease and identify po-
tential inroads for diagnosis and therapeutics. There was a lot of money at stake for phar-
maceutical and biotechnology industries in getting the ﬁrst look at the human genome
sequence. Money was also under the surface for the academic community as it was cru-
cial to the publicly funded eﬀort not to be rendered redundant in front of Congress, which
would fuel the next decades of research.
The competition to present the ﬁrst complete sequence of a human genome was widely
seen as a battle between advocates of free access and advocates of proprietary informa-
tion, but it was not that simple. At the time, the version published in Science magazine
[] in  represented an experiment in providing the general community access to data
generated by a private company.
Early history
To set the stage, it is important to go back to the Bayh-Dole Act. In an eﬀort to spur in-
novation and promote public-private partnerships, Congress in  declared that aca-
demic institutions and small businesses could hold on to intellectual property rights for
inventions made under federally funded research programs. Universities and research in-
stitutions were being encouraged to commercialize discoveries []. Later, there would be
debates over whether the Act had fostered a harmful anticommons [] and the National
Research Council in  [, p.] would conclude that it had ‘in some cases, impeded
the unrestricted sharing of publication-related data.’
Partly as a result of the Bayh-Dole Act, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Ven-
ter were at the center of a controversy over publication of genetic information well before
the  publication. Venter, working at NIH, had developed a rapid gene-ﬁnding ap-
proach based on markers called expressed sequence tags (ests). The head of NIH’s tech-
nology transfer oﬃce, Reid Adler, was contacted by an attorney at the biotechnology com-
pany Genentech Inc. because of concerns that publication of ests would result in patents
being denied to the biotechnology industry ‘even if the company had invested in the hard
work of reading out the gene’s whole sequence, identifying its protein, and ﬁguring out
what role it played in the body’ [, p.]. Adler proposed that NIH patent the ests ﬁrst;
academics could use the ests without cost and companies would be able to license them
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for a fee. Bernadine Healy, who was NIH director at the time, supported this idea as well,
and in  and  NIH applied for patents on , of these gene fragments.
The prospect of est patenting by NIH set oﬀ loud cries of opposition from the Pharma-
ceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA), biotechnology trade groups [], and some in
academia. Concern over the possibility that ests could be patented was one factor that led,
in , to the ‘Bermuda accord,’ an international agreement among themajor sequencing
groupsmandating that sequence data be deposited in a public database within  hours of
generation. This created prior art that could eﬀectively render the sequence material un-
patentable. It was also supposed to prevent duplication of eﬀorts and level the playing ﬁeld
so that large sequencing centers would not have a monopoly on the information [, ],
although, as I will describe, it is arguable whether a truly level playing ﬁeld exists. Initially
there was not an international consensus. The German research ministry had wanted to
allow companies months of advance access to data generatedwith their public funds, and
only reversed themselves because of threats by US and British scientists that their German
counterparts would be left out of the international community and denied access. Similar
discussions occurred in France as well [].
The beginnings of the genomewars
The Human Genome Project had originally been proposed by Charles DeLisi of the US
Department of Energy (DOE) in , and ﬁt in with the DOE goals of understanding
human mutation. NIH and the Wellcome Trust in the UK became the lead funders for
an international consortium of publicly funded sequencing groups (which will be called
the PFG here). The oﬃcial start date was  and, at a projected cost of $ billion, the
project was expected to take  years. The project was divided into mapping and sequenc-
ing phases, with the idea that maps of markers ordered along human chromosomes would
guide the sequencing strategy. OnMay ,  at a meeting of the genome community at
Cold Spring Harbor, New York, Michael Hunkapiller (representing Perkin-Elmer Corpo-
ration, which was innovating fast sequencingmachinery) and Venter announced that they
were forming a company (Celera Genomics) to sequence the human genome faster and
cheaper than the PFG. They would use the ‘shotgun sequencing’ approach pioneered by
Venter, which skipped the mapping step. It involved breaking the genome up into random
pieces and, via algorithms, reassembling the whole thing in one step. The cost was pro-
jected to be $-$ million and they said they would be ﬁnished  years earlier than
the PFG []. Venter announced that he would release data quarterly, which immediately
raised the outcry from Robert Waterston (head of the sequencing group at Washington
University, St. Louis) ‘Quarterly! That’s a lot diﬀerent from overnight.’ To which Venter
reportedly replied, ‘We’re a company, Bob. We don’t have to release the data at all. But if
you think about it, quarterly is a lot closer to nightly than it is to never’ [, p.].
The announcement at Cold Spring Harbor was the equivalent of stirring up an ant’s nest
with a stick. The PFG had originally envisioned producing a polished, error-free sequence
but now felt pushed to generate a quick-and-dirty product to be competitive with Celera.
I heard Phil Green (University of Washington, Seattle) sum up the situation graphically:
‘We don’t want to be the pooperscoopers for the Venterpillar’ and the Welcome Trust
announced that it would double the amount of money it was pouring into to the cause.
Venter was clear from the start that he planned to use the PFG data to help Celera’s
project. Access to public data gave Celera an advantage in assembling the sequence. Fran-
cis Collins of the NIH called it a breach of scientiﬁc ethics []. However, Celera received
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surprising support from no less than David Lipman, director of the National Center for
Biotechnology Information (NCBI) who said, ‘These groups understood when they de-
posited their data that the whole goal was to make it available without restrictions imme-
diately’ [].
Venter was walking a tightrope between achieving the academic goal of recognition and
the commercial goal of making money. Celera’s initial business plan was for the data to be
available by subscription. The idea was that the raw list of ordered nucleotides that make
up DNA needed to be annotated, i.e. translated by means of computer programs into the
genes and regulatory elements that could then be studied and harvested. The ﬁnancial
return for investors would be from the ability, for a fee, to access user-friendly tools with
which to analyze the information. Pharmaceutical companies paid $-$ million a year
and academic groups such as the Howard HughesMedical Institute (HHMI) paid $,-
$, per lab for access to the Celera data [].
From Celera’s point of view, the genome sequence they generated could not just be re-
leased because of the concern that competing companies would repackage the data and
sell it with their own tools. This concern was justiﬁed by actions of companies like Incyte
Pharmaceuticals which, as early as May , was selling a version of its database that in-
cluded publicly available sequence data that had been analyzed with Incyte’s proprietary
software.
Publishing principles and database protections
The war between the public and private eﬀorts would eﬀectively be over if Venter couldn’t
publish and Venter couldn’t publish if journals determined that his approach to data re-
lease violated journalistic policies.
There is a long tradition that a scientiﬁc publication must be complete enough so that
other scientists can reproduce the work. Before the advent of large datasets, this meant
showing the underlying data as part of the journal publication, but this became impractical
as datasets grew. Science began making explicit statements regarding database deposition
in an August ,  editorial in which Daniel E. Koshland, Jr. () wrote that Science
and other journals had developed procedures to help ensure that data would be sent to
appropriate repositories [].
ForDNA sequence, the repository was the public databaseGenBank and itsmirror sites.
While data inGenBank has always been freely accessible, as of September  thewebsite
still included the disclaimer that there might be patent, copyright, or other intellectual
property encumbrances on the data.
In  there were discussions about whether GenBank could cordon oﬀ some part of
itself so that the Celera data could be viewable but not downloadable []. David Lipman
indicated that NCBI did not have the resources to provide legal protection from copying
[] and could not even delay submission of a joint analysis to GenBank by  months. At
one point, the PFG was willing to oﬀer Celera a year’s worth of some form of intellectual
property protection as a database provider for data generated as part of a collaboration,
but Celera held out for - years []. In , no less proponents of openness than John
Sulston and Tim Hubbard of the UK Sanger Center brieﬂy considered such a model be-
cause of their concern that restrictions would be placed on reuse of the data [].
Had Celera been operating in Europe, there would have been legal protections for its
sequence database, as the European Union had enacted a database protection directive
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in  allowing database creators  years of protection for the time, money, and eﬀort
they had invested. However Celera was vulnerable in the United States. In  the US
SupremeCourtmade an important decision in Feist v. Rural Telephone. Feist incorporated
names, addresses, and phone numbers from Rural Telephone’s directory into their own
directory. Rural Telephone sued for copyright infringement, but the Supreme Court ruled
that the information in their compilation was factual, and that facts are not protected by
copyright. The reality that Rural Telephone had done the work of creating the database
did not entitle it to copyright protection. The database industry responded by seeking
help from Congress [], but no legislation was passed. It was thus clear in the period
between  and  that copyright law was not going to solve any of the issues being
raised about protection for genomic databases. There was nothing to prevent a competing
company from repackaging (with their own annotations) the Celera sequence and selling
it.
A battle of media leaks and press announcements ensued, making the project seem less
like noble science than a horse race, and splattering both sides with mud. To counter this,
President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair issued a joint statement on March
,  in which they called the sequencing of the genome ‘one of the most signiﬁcant
scientiﬁc projects of all time’ and praised the PFG for its open release of data []. The
statements were misinterpreted in the press as meaning that the leaders were going to
come out against the patenting of genes. The result was a slide in stock prices, with Celera
stock falling by % [].
In another eﬀort to shore up the public image of the ﬁeld, the race to the genome was
oﬃcially declared a draw. On June ,  it was announced that a draft sequence of the
human genome had been completed by both Celera and the PFG. Pictures of Venter and
Collins were taken with President Bill Clinton. One result was the sense that it would be
an embarrassment if the two sides didn’t publish side-by-side.
What was Science thinking?
Floyd Bloom, Editor-in-Chief of Science from  until June , focused on the lack of
existing database protections. Donald Kennedy took over as Editor-in-Chief in June 
and felt that there could be ﬂexibility in approaches to data access.
It was easy in - to ﬁnd examples where guidelines for data access were being
massaged to deal with realities of economics or to promote public-private interaction.One
situation that formed a foundation for Science’s approach to commercial and academic
access to data was the two-tier access existing at the time to the protein sequence archive
called SWISSPROT. In , SWISSPROT announced that, because its public funding
could not keep up with the growing number of sequences, it would charge a yearly license
fee to commercial users.a
Another example that was very much in Kennedy’s mind was a paper that Science had
published in  that was based on a large archive of proprietary geophysical exploration
data generated by EXXON Corporation []. The paper included summaries and not raw
data; however, Kennedy felt that the research provided important insights into the history
of sea-level change.
OnMay ,  Bloom and Kennedy, in an e-mail memorandum to both the PFG and
Celera, enunciated Science’s position as follows: ‘Access to the sequence is an essential
pre-requisite for publication - However we believe that the research community is open
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to more than one model for database access - Restrictions that provide protection against
commercial redistribution of the data can be consonant with publication in Science.’ (per-
sonal communication, Donald Kennedy).
License negotiations
The ﬁrst draft sent to Science by Celera in June,  was not acceptable to the journal.
There was a single click-through agreement for academic users, but commercial users and
bioinformatics ‘customers’ would have to pay a fee to see any of the data. Such an agree-
ment would have allowed users to examine the sequence only via browsing at the Celera
site and to only use the analytical tool BLAST at the site to search for particular genes
of interest. In addition, the ﬁrst draft did not contain a provision for Science to keep an
escrow copy, which Science considered vital for the archive of record. Science kept push-
ing for better access provisions and drafts were exchanged between Celera and Science
through the fall and early winter of .
A broad range of researchers (academic and commercial), bioethicists, lawyers, repre-
sentatives of other journals, and experts in technology transfer from NIH and Howard
Hughes Medical Institute (HHMI) were consulted. The ethics of diﬀerential access and
the meaning of veriﬁcation of published ﬁndings were at the center of many of the dis-
cussions. Celera was convinced to change the license terms so that for-proﬁt users could
get access to the data if they signed a material transfer agreement (MTA) that commit-
ted them to use the data for research purposes and not for commercialization. MTAs are
contracts that regulate the transfer of materials (such as cell lines, plasmids, chemicals,
or even software) between academic organizations and between academic organizations
and industry. Some contained restrictions as to how the material could be used, and how
and whether publications or commercial applications based on the material would be al-
lowed. MTAs might require that the researcher receiving the material allow the provider
a form of ‘droit de Seigneur’ in that the provider could review the draft of the researcher’s
publication or poster for a presentation, usually for  to  days.
In the agreements negotiated with Celera [], noncommercial users would not have
to sign an MTA; they would only have to execute a click-thru license and could then use
the sequence to make discoveries and commercialize them without any reach-through
provisions. A scientist working for a commercial organization could only get access to
the sequence for purposes of basic research and to verify conclusions presented in the
Science paper. In theory, that would make the data available to companies. However, even
to conﬁrm a result or to do basic research, it could be toxic for a company researcher to
look at the data as it might be diﬃcult to prove later that commercial advances had been
made independently. Realistically, the only way commercial users would get access to the
data was by paying for a subscription or getting a license from Celera.
Science received objections on philosophical grounds that any discrimination among
readers was unethical. However, others commented that after facing restrictions inMTAs
for clones and other materials they’d prefer to just pay for use of the data and be done with
it. In addition, it was not hard for some academics, with their more limited resources, to
accept the notion that the companies of theworldwould have to pay. Another reactionwas
that it was the lesser of two evils, with the greater evil being that the Celera data would
not be released at all. We were told that neither NIH nor the HHMI would block their
researchers from signing the agreements.
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The public-private divide wasn’t the only problem. For the burgeoning ﬁeld of bioin-
formatics, which was analyzing and working out how to draw meaning from the raw se-
quence, veriﬁcation was not enough; this community needed to be able to repost and re-
combine data. The ability to include chunks of data or a whole genome, not as a link to
someone else’s database, but as part of the actual paper was seen as crucial. The bioinfor-
matics community did not believe that the restrictions on their ability to pool data ﬁt a
reasonable deﬁnition of ‘accessible.’
The PFG decided in December  to ‘vote with their feet’ and publish their paper in
Nature instead of Science. Between December and February, when the publications ap-
peared [, ] we received intense reactions - ranging from a hostile letter writing cam-
paign to then National Academy of Sciences president Bruce Alberts’ appraisal, ‘If suc-
cessful, this model agreement could greatly increase public access to the large amount of
genome sequence data now held secret by private companies’ [].
Aftermath of the human genome publication
Celera and the Celera Genome. There was no question that the value of the Celera se-
quence, however well annotated, would decrease with time. Venter had said that he would
put the data into GenBank in  years and that happened in  []. Venter left Cel-
era and, like other genomic data-based companies, Celera turned to pharmaceuticals and
other avenues of proﬁt []. As of September ,  each of the two human genome pub-
lications had received more than , citations according to Google Scholars.
Rice. In  Science published the sequence of the rice genome produced by Syn-
genta’s Torrey Mesa Research Institute, under essentially the same provisions as the hu-
man genome paper. Rather than downloading the sequence, academics would be sent a
CD with the whole genome once they had signed a letter stating that they were using the
sequence for basic research. Kennedy’s rationalewas that he considered rice to be themost
important food crop in the world, but Science again received an outpouring of critical let-
ters.
The Cech committee. In response, the National Academies of Science formed the Com-
mittee on Responsibilities of Authorship in the Biological Sciences in October ,
headed by Thomas R. Cech. Their year-long investigation showed the existence of a gen-
eral consensus about the importance of sharing but implementation varied, leading them
to note ‘as in many human activities, the devil is in the details’ [, p.]. They came down
hard against the idea of any exceptions to sharing upon publication, creating the acronym
UPSIDE (the Uniform Principle for Sharing Integral Data and materials Expeditiously).
They concluded that the access via Science to the human genome and rice sequence was
static rather than the kind of dynamic access that would facilitate further research. How-
ever, they also recognized that lack of protection for companies who were generating
databases was an issue that could impede the publication process.
Science magazine. The Information to Contributors was changed to explicitly state ‘All
data necessary to understand, assess, and extend the conclusions of the manuscript must
be available to any reader of Science’ []. It took years for the desire on the part of some
of the genome community to punish Science to fade, but that has mostly disappeared.
Informationmay be free in heaven, but it’s not so easy down here
During the genomewars, researcherswhohad to contendwith the realities of theBermuda
accord were not ﬁnding it as straightforward as envisioned. If Venter was trying to ‘have
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his cake and eat it too’ by publishing in Science but still protecting corporate interests,
some of the large scale sequencers were trying to do the same. They were advocating the
high moral ground of immediate release in public while working in private to secure their
publication advantage. Partial genomes, posted before the genome sequence was actu-
ally ﬁnished, were treasure-troves to scientists waiting to parse raw sequence into genes
and regulatory elements and answer speciﬁc questions of biological and medical inter-
est. As early as , this tension was clear in disputes between major sequencing centers
working on the genomes of agents that cause sleeping sickness or malaria and individual
researchers eager to annotate genomes and use them in medical research [].
The sequencers developed the culture of the gentlemen’s agreement, which basically
said that although anyone could look at and do research with the data, they could not
publish until certain conditions were met. Sometimes this meant getting permission from
the original sequencing group. In other cases researchers would have to refrain from pub-
lishing whole genome analyses until the originating group had published. There came to
be a clear distinction between release of data to public access and the time when it was
really free of encumbrances [].
This did, however, leave a lot of grey areas. For example, the editor of Immunology Today
asked if the sequencers had rights to sit on the data forever or if there was to be a time
limit (such as a year) beyond which publication could be open to anyone []. Rowen and
Hood [] replied, saying that the time limit would have to start once all the data had
been gathered to be fair to data producers, which could take years. Richard Hyman of
the Stanford Genome Technology Center went further, responding that in the absence of
written consent a third party publishing an analysis would be committing plagiarism and
fraud [].
The Fort Lauderdale meeting of January  attempted to sort out some of the issues
[]. The  participants reaﬃrmed the rapid release principles but presented the case
that it was in everyone’s interest to nurture data producers who were involved in commu-
nity resource projects. Funding agencies were called on to provide support for curation,
maintenance, and distribution of the data and resources to the producers so they could
analyze their data. Resource producers were asked (‘when feasible’) to generate and pub-
lish a project description or marker paper at the beginning of the community resource
project, that would act as a citable reference and lay out the analyses for which they ex-
pected to have priority. Resource users were told that they should respect the legitimate
rights of the producers by citing the marker paper, and respect the need of the producers
to publish. No time limit for the prerogative of sequence producers to publish ﬁrst was
set. And, in a statement that sent a chill through the hearts of a number of journal editors,
the Wellcome Trust report of the meeting speciﬁcally said it was the role of the journals
to ensure that the system worked fairly for everyone.
This has left the journals in the middle. Sometimes publications would be moving along
smoothly, with peace reigning among the analysts and junior members of the sequencing
teams as co-authors, only for the journal to discover that the heads of the sequencing
centers had not been consulted andwere not happywith the deals that had beenmade.Nor
is this kind of dispute old history. In August of , a paper was published online at the
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science (PNAS) that dealt with a gene associated
with substance dependence in women of European descent. One of the authors had signed
a Data Use Certiﬁcation in which he agreed not to submit publications based on the Study
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of the Addiction, Genetics, and Environment dataset until September ,  but the
dataset was used in the PNAS paper. The authors had to retract their paper on September
,  [].
The National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI) established a -month
moratorium on publication by third parties of data from the Encyclopedia of DNA El-
ements (ENCODE). An update to the policies was issued in November of , extend-
ing that moratorium to ‘all forms of public disclosure, including meeting abstracts, oral
presentations, and formal electronic submissions to publicly accessible sites (e.g., public
websites, web blogs)’ [].
The Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging Initiative (ADNI) is an example of a public-
private partnership that has been notably successful in eﬀorts to collaborate and to have
precompetitive data generated by a company made available to academic researchers.
However, access to the data generated requires researchers to sign a data use agreement
in which they aﬃrm not to redistribute the data and to cite the ADNI in amanner deemed
appropriate by an ADNI Data and Publications Committee [].
The genome community has recently bumped into another problem that could aﬀect
the future of eﬀorts to reap the fruits of the human genome project. To understand hu-
man variation, especially with regard to inherited disease, it is necessary to accumulate
not just one but many genome sequences. To protect the privacy of participants in re-
search studies, eﬀorts have been made to deidentify the information or to present only
data from pooled samples. However, the community has been shocked to learn that these
approaches don’t suﬃce - by algorithmic means or by combining anonymized sequence
data with other freely available information it has been possible to reidentify certain indi-
viduals [, ]. Concern about this situation forcedNIH and theWellcomeTrust to block
public access to certain information in the databases dbGAP (The Database of Genotypes
and Phenotypes) and CGEMS (a site for cancer genetics work) []. Certainly there are
laws (e.g. the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of  (HIPAA) and
theGenetic InformationNondiscriminationAct of  (GINA)) that have been passed in
order to protect privacy of medical data and to prevent discrimination in health insurance
and employment on the basis of DNA information. However, informed consent is made
more diﬃcult by the impossibility of knowing the possible uses to which research data
may be put in the future or the eﬀects of aggregation of diﬀerent kinds of personal data
on privacy. Without volunteers allowing their information to be used, medical research
studies that could beneﬁt society as a whole will be impossible. Possible resolutions, such
as controlled access to data that might otherwise be more freely shared, await future res-
olution.
Conclusions: a bigger picture
While the focus has been on the history of the ‘genome wars’, they did not occur in isola-
tion, as discussions regarding information access have been occurring simultaneously in a
variety of disciplines (Figure ). Two forces are currently impacting the research commu-
nity - the need to protect individual privacy regarding information and the push towards
open access to data - and the outcomes are not yet clear. Data available from such sources
as mobile phone calls, social media information, consumer information collected by com-
panies, and government data have been described as revolutionizing the social sciences
to an extent comparable to the eﬀect that the microscope had on the biological sciences
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Figure 1 Key events in the publication of a draft sequence of the human genome against a
background of information access history.
[]. However such data individually (and, more importantly, in combination) could ren-
der current notions of privacy obsolete.
Large proprietary datasets have been made available to particular researchers because
of the relationships or contractual agreements they have forged with the data-generating
companies, which raises questions for reproducibility and review for the social science
community []. For example, Wang et al. in  [] published research relating to the
way that mobile viruses can spread, which has implications for the telecommunications
infrastructure. Their ﬁndings were based on the anonymized billing records provided by
. million mobile phone subscribers. As the privacy of the records were protected by
law, the authors noted in the Supplemental Online Material that they would provide fur-
ther information on request and told Science that as long as the researchers were willing to
observe the same privacy, technological, security, and legal limitations that they were sub-
ject to at the time of the request, they would be glad to facilitate data access at their center
(personal communication, A.-L. Barabasi). The motivations for some of these companies
to release data to investigators are to learn more about their own clients and operations
or to forge deals in which the researchers look at questions of interest to them. However,
commentators have complained that such ‘private’ data threaten the capacity for inde-
pendent replication on which science is based []. (As Bernardo Huberman said ‘if an
independent set of data fails to validate results derived from privately owned data, how do
we know whether it is because those data are not universal or because the authors made
a mistake?’ [].) Whether privately arranged access to data that form the basis of scien-
tiﬁc publications or release only of aggregated data that protect company or individual
privacy will continue remains to be seen. Certainly further investment in technology that
can ensure control over the anonymization of data is warranted.
Nor is it easy for private companies to release such data without strings attached. Un-
derstanding how people search for information is an active area of research in the social
sciences. In  researchers employed by America Online, Inc. (AOL) published log ﬁles
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encompassing ,, searches done by users of AOL’s proprietary client software on
the Internet. This was done without the consent of the individuals involved and, even
though screen names had been removed, New York Times reporters and others rapidly
showed that it was possible to infer the identities of some of the searchers from the in-
formation that was released []. Even with these problems, some scientists said that the
data release was a service to the research community []. AOL was widely criticized in
the blogosphere and in mainstream media, some individuals at AOL lost their jobs, and
the company was the target of a class-action lawsuit.
There is a long history of eﬀorts to protect individual privacy in the United States and
Europe covering a wide range of human activity. Some recent events should be noted as
they could aﬀect researchers’ ability to gather data. In the EuropeanUnion, a General Data
Protection Regulation was proposed in January of  and is expected to take eﬀect by
 []. Two provisions could be especially challenging for the research community.
The regulation stipulates that data can only be saved for as long as a need can be demon-
strated. It also codiﬁes a ‘right to be forgotten’ - that any individual has the right to have
his/her data removed from a database at any time. The European Commission has stated
that personal data ‘is any information relating to an individual, whether it relates to his
or her private, professional or public life. It can be anything from a name, a photo, an
email address, bank details, your posts on social networking websites, your medical in-
formation, or your computer’s IP address’ []. In the United States, the Federal Trade
Commission recently released recommendations for protecting consumer privacy, which
included provisions for controls over howmuch data companies can collect on individuals
andhow long they can retain it aswell as a recommendation that companies establish a ‘do-
not-track’ mechanism for consumers who do not wish to have their information gathered
[]. There need to be consistent, transparent regulations that will safeguard the public
but allow research to move forward.
While concerns about privacy could restrict data dissemination, another force is acting
to promote access. The idea that sequence information should be freely available was a
reﬂection of a much broader eﬀort by diverse parts of the scientiﬁc community to make
access to the results of scientiﬁc research faster and cost-free. The open source movement
started between the s and s with the goal of creating, developing, and dissem-
inating free computer operating systems that would break the hold of corporate entities
[]. While journals that are freely available to readers began to appear by the early s
[] the open access movement gained momentum at about the same time as the human
genome project was oﬃcially starting. In , a year after the oﬃcial start to the human
genomeproject, PaulGinsparg createdArXiv, a pre-publication serverwhose purposewas
to facilitate rapid dissemination of scientiﬁc information, without subscription fees, page
charges, or peer review []. It is currently possible to access more than , e-prints
on ArXiv in physics, mathematics, computer science, quantitative biology, quantitative ﬁ-
nance, and statistics.b The National Library of Medicine formed PubMedCentral in 
in order to have a free repository for NIH-funded research. Initially deposition was volun-
tary, but Congressional action (the Consolidated Appropriations Act of  (H.R. ))
made depositionmandatory with release no later than a year post-publication, after statis-
tics showed poor compliance by the fundees.
At roughly the same time as the report of the Cech committee came down hard on the
idea of restrictions to data access in published papers two major manifestos of the open
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access movement, the Budapest open access initiative [] and the Berlin declaration []
appeared. Certainly some of the statements of groups and individuals who were most vo-
ciferous in their opposition to Science’s eﬀorts to look for alternatives in publishing data
reﬂect the philosophy of the open accessmovement. TheWellcome Trust, which has been
a prime mover in supporting open access declared recently that ‘Our support for open ac-
cess publishing was a natural progression of our involvement in the international Human
Genome Project during the s and early s, where the decision to place the human
genetic sequence in the public domain immediately as it was generated helped to ensure
this key research resource could be used by scientists the world over’ [].
There have been several attempts, via proposals in , , and  to legislate a
Federal Research Public Access Act to require that research funded by  federal agen-
cies be made freely and publicly available in government sponsored repositories within 
months of publication. While the advantages and disadvantages for researchers, funding
agencies, and publishers are still being debated, the open access movement has a great
deal of energy and backers willing to ﬁnance it (at least in the short term).
Does publication, whether in a repository or a journal, mean that enough information is
released to form a solid foundation for future research? Despite high-minded principles,
the published literature reﬂects the fact that many researchers do not, left to their own
devices, rush to share data. Even when the Journal of Biostatistics oﬀered to give formal
recognition to authors who provided enough data andmethods in their papers to allow an
editor to replicate the ﬁndings, only a small percent complied []. Although the extent of
sharing varies fromﬁeld to ﬁeld, common reasons given for withholding data are similar: it
is toomuchwork, it removes the competitive advantage from the scientists who generated
the data andwho require publications for their careers, or the raw data was received under
conﬁdentiality agreements. The Dataverse Network is a repository for social science data
that allows depositors to note concerns and restrictions. In a  survey of the conditions
for use posted by more than , users, Stodden [] found the most common were
‘maintaining subject conﬁdentiality, preventing further sharing, making a speciﬁc citation
form a condition of use, restricting access by commercial or proﬁt-making entities, and
restricting use to a speciﬁc community, such as that of the researcher’s home institution.’
Certainly the granting and funding and tenure cultures need to enforce good behavior,
which people have been saying for years. NIH nowmandates that provisions for data shar-
ing be included in research applications for $, or more of direct costs in any single
year and several other agencies have similar provisions. The NSF states that to apply for a
grant as of January ,  ‘All proposals must describe plans for data management and
sharing of the products of research, or assert the absence of the need for such plans’ [].
The two-page data management plan submitted as part of the application may include
‘policies and provisions for re-use, re-distribution, and the production of derivatives’ and
‘plans for archiving data, samples, and other research products, and for preservation of
access to them.’ Although the NSF-wide mandate takes precedence, there are variations
within the directorates []. For example, the NSF Division of Earth Sciences allows up
to  years of exclusive data use for selected principal investigators. The directorate for
Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences allows for the possibility of ethical and legal
restrictions regarding access to non-aggregated data.
Community service, whether through generation of shared data or sharing of knowl-
edge and communication with the public needs to be formally recognized. A Data and
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InformaticsWorking Group has recommended that NIH provide incentives for data shar-
ing by providing information on the number of times datasets in its central repository are
accessed or downloaded [].
Even when academic communities are willing to share data, public repositories do not
always exist and those that do are under siege in unstable economic environments. It can
be easy to drum up funds to create databases, but not so easy to ﬁnd federal or other
moneys to sustain them. Data repositories need continuing support.
The momentum in academia is clearly that releasing and not hoarding data is a virtue.
However, the history and examples cited in this paper show that while data sharing may
become second nature, it is not an easy, seamless process and is not happening without
challenges and compromises.
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